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PETER GATRELL
WAR, REFUGEEDOM, REVOLUTION
Understanding Russia’s refugee crisis, 1914‑1918
Human mobility has long preoccupied historians of Russia. Studies abound on the 
scale, dynamics and significance of internal migration in tsarist, Soviet and post‑ 
Soviet Russia. Forced migration in the Stalin era has been a markedly fruitful field, 
but the richness of work on other periods should not be discounted. State practices 
and migrants’ experiences have been the subject of significant recent interventions 
pointing to the role played by mobility in Russia in relation to broader historical 
processes. Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moch focus as much on what they 
call “repertoires of migration” as they do upon institutional arrangements. In 
another important contribution, John Randolph and Eugene Avrutin suggest that 
“what happens ‘on the move’ can help us appreciate the intersection of many polit‑
ical, social, and cultural forces within the past and analyse their interplay without 
asserting the absolute supremacy of one over the other.”1 
These myriad forces were certainly evident during the First World War. When 
war broke out in 1914 it was widely understood that Russia had but recently recov‑
ered from the explosive events of war and revolution in 1904‑1905. But mass popu‑
lation displacement, the phenomenon that tsarist contemporaries characterised as 
bezhenstvo [refugeedom], had no precedent in Russia’s history. Refugeedom cast 
migration in an entirely new light. The tsarist state struggled to come to terms with 
1. John Randolph and Eugene Avrutin, eds, Russia in Motion: Cultures of Human Mobility 
since 1850 (Champaign‑Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), quotation at p. 6; Lewis 
H. Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moch, Broad is My Native Land: Repertoires and Regimes 
of Migration in Russia’s Twentieth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). Among 
many other studies, see Nicholas Breyfogle, Abby Schrader and Willard Sunderland, eds, 
Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History (London: Rout‑
ledge, 2007); Mark Bassin, Christopher Ely, and Melissa K. Stockdale, eds, Space, Place, and 
Power in Modern Russia: Essays in the New Spatial History (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univer‑
sity Press, 2010); Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: the History and Geography of Forced 
Migrations in the USSR (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004, translated from 
the Russian edition, published in 2001).
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the unplanned migration of at least six million internally displaced people. In an 
attempt to put this in context, an eminent Russian demographer wrote subsequently 
that “in two short years the movement of refugees and evacuees was as considerable 
as it had been during the migration to Siberia over a 25‑year period, 1885‑1909.”2 
Existing controls on population settlement could simply not be maintained. The 
emergency caught Russia unawares, obliging the tsarist government to invent 
policy on the hoof, not only to assist refugees but also to respond to the demand of 
educated society (tsenzovoe obshchestvo) for action. Nor did Russia’s withdrawal 
from the war following the Bolshevik Revolution bring an end to the turbulent 
process of mass population displacement: the prolonged Civil War and related 
conflicts unleashed further demographic upheaval. A mass exodus of Bolshevik 
opponents from Russian territory was one manifestation of this upheaval. So, too, 
was the repatriation of millions of people who had been displaced during the war 
and who opted to return to homes that were now located in sovereign states, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Latvia.3
The protracted refugee crisis poses a challenge to the historiography of migra‑
tion in Russia: how do historians accommodate refugeedom into existing interpre‑
tations of war and revolution? A flurry of recent scholarship has shed new light on 
the dimensions of displacement and the institutional changes that were introduced 
in wartime Russia to manage migration and assist refugees. But there remain other 
issues where historians have an opportunity to intervene. These include the relation‑
ship between governance and accountability, key issues today in refugee studies 
and in humanitarianism. Historians also need to establish more clearly the range of 
social attitudes towards refugees and the experiences of refugees themselves.4
This article examines the refugee crisis in Russia in the era of war and revo‑
lution, including questions about the source material, the historiography and the 
reasons for historiographical neglect; and about its political, social and cultural 
significance then and now, in the light of the refugee studies literature that has blos‑
somed over the past quarter of a century. The political significance of the refugee 
crisis entails fundamental questions about the legitimacy of various forms of inter‑
vention designed to ameliorate the difficult situation faced by refugees. Focusing 
on “significance” directs our attention to issues around relief programmes, or 
what in current parlance would be characterised as humanitarian assistance. How 
did contemporaries understand the objectives of relief work? Should we charac‑
terise refugee relief efforts as the manifestation of humanitarianism, or were other 
impulses at play in Russia at this juncture? Repatriation also deserves scrutiny: this 
was as complex to undertake in post‑1917 post‑imperial Russian space as it has 
2. Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes 1917‑1947 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 32.
3. Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War 1 (Bloom‑
ington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
4. These are huge topics. I have attempted to map the field in Peter Gatrell, The Making of the 
Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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proved to be in other contexts.5 The article also asks to what extent refugees were 
able to express themselves, whether to lament the circumstances leading to their 
displacement, to criticise the arrangements made on their behalf, or to articulate a 
sense of their future. Given the impressive volume of work that has used workers’ 
testimony to illuminate Russian labour history, it is worth considering what kind of 
testimony survives from refugees. 
The first two sections discuss some of the extant source material, including 
Anglophone accounts. The article goes on to consider the politics and practice 
of relief work. The penultimate section looks at the ramifications of population 
displacement in 1917 and beyond. The final section addresses directly the issue of 
refugee voices.
Historiography and sources
Two very broad and related factors explain the transformation of the field of study 
in the last 20 years or so. The first is the collapse of communism and the grand 
challenge to a Soviet orthodoxy that neglected social groups that could not be 
accommodated in a Marxist‑Leninist framework. After 1991 it became possible 
to consider the destabilising impact of war beyond the revolutionary working 
class and armed forces.6 The second factor is what might broadly be termed a 
post‑modern subversion of grand historical narratives, which took place at around 
the same time that public opinion in the West gained a greater awareness of the 
magnitude of fresh population displacement across the globe, including in Afghan‑
istan, Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It is also important to add that post‑Soviet histo‑
rians were living in a radically different spatial as well as political environment; 
they could not fail to be aware of the shock of territorial reconfiguration and its 
impact on population displacement in the former Soviet Union.7 For these reasons, 
there has lately been an efflorescence of work by scholars on wartime population 
displacement in Russia and Ukraine, and also in Belarus, the Baltic countries, and 
5. An excellent guide to refugee studies is Elena Fiddian‑Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long 
and Nando Sigona, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6. In addition to work cited below, see A.N. Kurtsev, “Bezhentsy pervoi mirovoi voiny [Refu‑
gees of the First World War],” Voprosy istorii, no. 8 (1999): 98‑113; Eric Lohr, Nationalizing 
the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War 1 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), Joshua Sanborn, “Unsettling the Empire: Violent 
Migrations and Social Disaster in Russia during World War I,” Journal of Modern History, 77, 
2 (2005): 290‑324; Willard Sunderland, The Baron’s Cloak: A History of the Russian Empire 
in War and Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
7. Rogers Brubaker, “Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples,” in Karen Barkey 
and Mark von Hagen, eds, After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation‑Building: The 
Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1997), 155‑80; Peter Gatrell, “World Wars and Population Displacement in Europe in the 
Twentieth Century,” Contemporary European History, 16, 4 (2007): 415‑426.
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Poland. These publications bring fresh archival material to light on charitable relief 
and the organisation of social welfare, particularly at a local and regional level.8
Yet for decades the only publication of note in Russian relating to population 
displacement in the era of the First World War was a brief and tantalising encyclo‑
pedia entry on “refugeedom” by Abram Kirzhnits in the first edition of the Soviet 
historical encyclopedia. Kirzhnits was at pains to emphasise that civilians quit their 
homes in Russia’s western borderlands on account of enemy invasion in the first 
phase of the war, but that mass population displacement also resulted from the 
concerted actions of the tsarist army in deporting civilians from Grodno, Kovno, 
Kurland and other provinces. Kirzhnits termed this a “bacchanalia of forced migra‑
tion” (bakkhanaliia vysleneniia) that ensnared Poles, Jews, Latvians, Lithuanians, 
Belarusians and Ukrainians. These minorities were targeted on account of their 
presumed disloyalty to the empire; Jews in particular suffered from widespread 
antisemitism. One of the consequences of their deportation—the dissolution of the 
Pale of Settlement—was unexpected, although according to Kirzhnits the presence 
of Jews in the Russian interior did little to lessen the prejudice they faced.9 Kirzhnits 
relied upon official and semi‑official accounts to paint a picture of the scale of the 
refugee crisis and the most notable organisations involved in relief work, including 
the assistance provided by trade unions in Moscow, Riga, Samara, and elsewhere. 
The sources remained buried in the archives of pre‑revolutionary government and 
non‑governmental institutions. But these institutions evaporated—or were eviscer‑
ated—and this helped foster historical amnesia about refugeedom.
Little work of note on the refugee crisis therefore appeared in the Soviet era. 
One exception proves the rule: the memoirs of Evgenii A. Nikol´skii were written 
in exile and subsequently deposited in the Hoover Institution. His memoirs include 
around one hundred pages on “Refugees during the Great War.”10 Nikol´skii had 
first‑hand experience of assisting refugees as they travelled in summer 1915 from 
8. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking; Nick P. Baron and Peter Gatrell, eds, Homelands: War, 
Population and Statehood in the Former Russian Empire, 1918‑1924 (London: Anthem Books, 
2004); Mariusz Korzeniowski, Marek Mądzik and Dariusz Tarasiuk, Tułaczy los Uchodźcy 
polscy w imperium rosyjskim w latach pierwszej wojny światowej [Wandering fate: Polish 
refugees in the Russian Empire during the First World War] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniw‑
ersytetu M. Curie‑Sklodowskiej, 2007); Tomas Balkelis and Violeta Davoliūtė, eds, Popu‑
lation Displacement in Lithuania in the 20th century: Experiences, Identities and Legacies 
(Amsterdam: Brill‑Rodopi, 2016), particularly the essays by Balkelis, Andrea Griffante, and 
Klaus Richter; Peter Gatrell and Liubov Zhvanko, eds, Europe on the Move: the First World 
War and its Refugees (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).
9. A. Kirzhnits, “Bezhenstvo [Refugeedom],” Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 5 
(M., 1927), cols. 176‑177. Kirzhnits (1888‑1940) was a journalist, historian and bibliographer. 
Born in Bobruisk (Babryusk), he attended school in Belostok before being expelled for revo‑
lutionary activity. In 1915, partly on account of his activities on behalf of the Bund, he was 
deported to Siberia where he worked for several Siberian newspapers. In 1920 he returned to 
Belarus where he resumed his career as a journalist before taking up a post in Moscow as editor 
of Moskovskii proletarii. His main interests were the Jewish labour movement and the history 
of the Jewish press. He was arrested in 1937.
10. E.A. Nikol´skii, “Bezhentsy v velikuiu voiny 1914‑1918 gg. [Refugees in the Great War 
1914‑1918],” included in his “Zapiski o proshlom za 55 let [Notes on the past 55 years ]” 
(unpublished manuscript, San Francisco, 1934).
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the vicinity of Kobrin/Kobryn in Russian Poland, around 25 km from the front 
line, where many thousands had been kept in temporary refugee camps, to the 
Russian interior. Shortly afterwards he was engaged by Severopomoshch´ (liter‑
ally, “Northern Aid”), part of the bureaucratic apparatus created by the Ministry of 
the Interior as a rival to the public organisations that were operating in the vicinity 
of the front (see below).11 
Nikol´skii began his account by acknowledging the paucity of scholarship on 
the refugee crisis, and of course, his decision to emigrate after the Bolshevik Revo‑
lution gave him a particular perspective on the disastrous consequences of the First 
World War. He provided a vivid description of the plight of refugees and their 
arduous journey to European Russia via the Pinsk marshes once it became clear that 
they were unlikely to be able to return to their homes any time soon. Most refugees 
had been forced to abandon their livestock, since no room could be found for draft 
animals on the trains from Roslavl´ to Moscow. He drew an important distinction 
between refugees of modest means and those from a more privileged background. 
Another key point was the fact that the decisions taken by the Russian army had 
direct repercussions on refugees, but that military commanders evinced no interest 
in the relief of refugees. Nikol´skii also maintained that Severopomoshch´ and 
other aid organisations employed an excessive number of staff who thereby evaded 
the military draft including, as he put it, “many Jews.”12 
In emphasising that “no‑one who was not present to witness these events 
can have any idea of the suffering that these unfortunate people had to endure,” 
Nikol´skii spoke in terms that are common to other accounts of refugee crises. 
He admitted that he had neither “the paints, nor the talent” to describe the terrible 
experiences of refugees, which included not only the risk of contracting cholera or 
typhus but also intermittent exposure to aerial bombardment. He added—another 
familiar flourish—that refugees had become a “chaotic throng” liable to panic at 
the first sign of the enemy. In more sympathetic vein he stressed refugees’ attempts 
to re‑establish contact with loved ones from whom they had become separated. 
But he also bemoaned the fact that refugees took matters into their own hands, 
particularly when it came to seeking out stocks of food. This—the purchase of 
food and its distribution at specified points to bona fide refugees—he regarded as 
his responsibility.13 
In sum, Nikol´skii betrayed a degree of prejudice along with his acute realisation 
of the magnitude of the refugee crisis. Like other contemporaries he voiced anxiety 
about the behaviour of refugees whose “spontaneous” actions threatened to make 
an already intolerable situation in the Russian interior even worse. As we shall see, 
this sense of impending catastrophe takes the reader into the realm of political crisis 
and notions of social collapse.
11. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 43; Nikol´skii, “Zapiski,” 240. 
12. Nikol´skii, “Zapiski,” 215, 241‑242.
13. Ibid., 257‑258, 262‑266.
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Distant suffering: contemporary Anglophone views of the refugee crisis
The plight of refugees in the Russian Empire first came to the attention of the 
English‑speaking world in 1915 when the Englishman John Pollock published an 
article in the Fortnightly Review. Pollock (1878‑1963) belonged by virtue of his 
privileged background to the British elite. During the First World War he served as 
chief commissioner of the Great Britain‑Poland Fund (originally the “Great Britain 
to Poland and Galicia Committee”).14 In July 1915 he travelled to Kiev under the 
auspices of the Russian Red Cross. His article described “a pool of human misery 
[…] a world apart from anything known before […] its inhabitants are of one 
class, one type, one character, and they have but one name. They are the Refu‑
gees.” He added that this “wailing multitude [has] reached the point of complete 
apathy.” Most of them were Ruthenian peasants from Galicia who “in everything 
tend towards Russian culture” (sic). Pollock evoked the idea of the early medieval 
‘”wandering of the peoples” as the only equivalent to this mass movement of popu‑
lation. Deploying another cultural reference, he described a baby at its mother’s 
breast; the woman had “a face like Michelangelo’s Delphic Sybil on the Sistine 
Chapel.” The only crumb of comfort was the delivery of hot meals and baths by 
a British committee headed by a Yorkshire engineer who had narrowly “escaped 
from death on the Galician oilfields.” There was also a promise of help from the 
Tatiana Committee (see below).15 In general, Pollock’s account was characterised 
by a patronising tone, reinforcing a sense that refugees might be helped, but could 
not help themselves. This, and his repertoire of cultural allusions, makes it worthy 
of note.
A more extensive and informative account of refugees in Russia appeared in 
1916, penned by British nurse Violetta Thurstan (1879‑1978). Thurstan joined the 
British Red Cross in 1913 and spent several weeks helping the war wounded in 
Belgium until she transferred to the Russian Red Cross. She wrote of her experi‑
ences in two books including a unique account in English, The People Who Run: the 
Tragedy of the Refugees in Russia. After leaving Russia she returned to Belgium, 
where she was wounded, before taking up a position as a hospital nurse in Mace‑
donia where she remained until the end of the war. After the war she turned her 
attention to other pursuits, but she did not abandon her interest in refugees. In 1923 
she took a post with the Egyptian government as director of Bedouin industries in 
14. “Polish relief,” The Times (London), 2 April 1915, noted that “every pound will save 
32 people from starvation for a week.” An obituary in The Times, 23 July 1963, explains 
that he was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, before becoming a newspaper 
correspondent in Helsinki, Berlin and Paris. Pollock’s book, War and Revolution in Russia: 
Sketches and Studies (1918), reprints some of his journalism and includes an account of his 
escape from Bolshevik captivity.
15. John Pollock, “The Refugees at Kiev,” Fortnightly Review, 585 (September 1915), 
476‑479. Violetta Thurstan was full of praise for the work of the Tatiana Committee in Kiev, 
which compared very favourably to the situation in other cities. Another observer of the refugee 
crisis was the American archaeologist Thomas Whittemore, but he left no published account of 
his work. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 81.
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Arab refugee camps close to Cairo where women were employed in carpet making. 
In 1937 she worked in Spain helping wounded civilians during the civil war and 
working on behalf of prisoners. At the end of the Second World War her career in 
refugee relief continued when she joined the Catholic Relief Programme, evacu‑
ating and resettling children, working with prisoners of war and displaced persons 
in Italy, Egypt, and Austria.16 She belongs to that large body of British female 
voluntary aid workers who moved from country to country in the middle years of 
the 20th century, gaining expertise in the field as they did so.17
The People Who Run drew on Thurstan’s experiences of the initial Russian 
retreat to Warsaw and the great retreat in summer 1915 during which she worked 
in a series of field hospitals.18 Like Pollock, she revealed a sensitive if somewhat 
patronising approach to refugees—“some of the saddest people that ever were 
seen”—whose overcrowded accommodation meant “the indiscriminate mingling 
of the decent and the dissolute.” She frequently came into contact with apathetic 
refugees, but she drew a distinction between lethargy and “slacking and sham‑
ming,” since inertia could not be helped. Refugees had, in her view, lost a sense of 
self‑respect, but they deserved sympathy: “their sorrow […] is a vicarious one, for 
they have suffered and died in order that our homes, our country and our children 
shall be safe.” She distinguished between men and women:
The old men can be made content with a little tobacco and the company of their 
old cronies; perhaps, too, they are a little more used to travelling and mixing with 
the outside world than the women, who seem to miss terribly their accustomed 
seat near the stove among their familiar household goods.19
Warming to her theme about population displacement and the consequences 
attendant on the collapse of patriarchal authority, including what she saw as a 
loss of moral compass, Thurstan praised female students in Petrograd who “have 
done admirable work in keeping the young girls straight and out of temptation” 
and singled out aid organisations that arranged classes for young boys “on the 
Boy Scout principles” who were taught a trade and thereby encouraged to keep 
out of mischief.20
16. Melissa Hardie‑Budden, “Thurstan, Anna Violet (1879‑1978),” Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, October 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/
view/article/59611, accessed 12 January 2016].
17. Sibyl Oldfield, Doers of the World: British Women Humanitarians 1900‑1950 (London: 
Continuum, 2006).
18. Her other works include Field Hospital and Flying Column (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1915). See also Christine Hallett, Veiled Warriors: Allied Nurses of the First World War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Laurie S. Stoff, Russia’s Sisters of Mercy and the 
Great War: More Than Binding Men’s Wounds (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015).
19. Violetta Thurstan, The People Who Run: The Tragedy of the Refugees in Russia (New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1916), 38.
20. Thurstan, The People Who Run, 72.
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Thurstan was also attentive to the impact of the war on ordinary Russians 
who were confronted by a massive sudden influx of refugees. Poor households in 
particular faced mounting household bills as the price of food and rents rose. She 
noted the desperate situation in some provincial cities, such as Kazan, where refu‑
gees and locals were also expected to share resources with Austrian prisoners of 
war and wounded soldiers who were being treated in the university medical school. 
In these circumstances, she could only express admiration for peasants who treated 
refugees “as members of the family.”21 However, her compassion did not extend to 
Jews in general or to Jewish refugees in particular. Thurstan betrayed her own prej‑
udices when announcing that “many Jews have on the whole German sympathies.” 
Nor did Jewish refugees “suffer so acutely from homesickness [since] they are 
wanderer by nature or sub‑conscious instinct. They settle down more quickly […] 
and take more easily to new work.” Another consideration in her view was that their 
situation was mitigated by “the extraordinary generosity shown by many Jews to 
their co‑religionists,” by which she meant the financial aid from Jews living over‑
seas.22 In her view, other refugee groups deserved greater sympathy and attention.
The accounts published by Thurstan and Pollock lend weight to the suggestion 
that the Russian refugee crisis generated a powerful sense of what has come to be 
called ‘distant suffering’ that relied upon graphic representations of distress and 
allusions to culturally familiar episodes from the past.23 Pollock and Thurstan both 
appealed for donations from members of the British public. Thurstan in particular 
drew attention to international interest in Russian refugees from the National Union 
of Women’s Suffrage Societies, the Salvation Army, and the Great Britain‑Poland 
Fund, which placed an advert in her book to inform readers of the use to which their 
donations would be put. To be sure, her emphasis on Allied charity was calculated to 
sustain the commitment of the British public to its Russian ally, but taking a broader 
view we can also see the articulation of a business‑like humanitarian ethos in which 
considerations of value for money mattered no less than the relief of suffering.24
Contours of crisis and relief efforts
For a number of reasons the Russian press devoted considerable attention to the 
plight of refugees during the war. Russian newspapers and periodicals reported on 
21. Ibid., 142‑143.
22. Ibid., 150‑153. See also The Jews in the Eastern War Zone (New York: The American 
Jewish Committee, 1916).
23. Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).
24. Thurstan’s point about the destination, purchasing power and effectiveness of the British 
pound, speaks to recent work on the accountability of charitable enterprise. Sarah Roddy, 
Julie‑Marie Strange and Bertrand Taithe, “The Charity‑Mongers of Modern Babylon: Bureau‑
cracy, Scandal, and the Transformation of the Philanthropic Marketplace, c.1870–1912,” 
Journal of British Studies, 54, 1 (2015): 118‑137.
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the relief efforts undertaken by the government, by semi‑official bodies such as the 
Tatiana Committee for the Relief of War Victims, by public organisations, notably 
the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns, and by diocesan committees and 
private individuals, as well as by newly‑formed national committees, all of which 
exercised significant leverage and enjoyed considerable leeway.25 There were 
several reasons for the attention given to the refugee crisis in Russian public life. 
Chief amongst them were the suddenness and scale of population displacement 
in the spring and summer of 1915. But the crisis also afforded an opportunity for 
different political interests to capitalise on the crisis, and to project fears of social 
and economic instability on to refugees. Rival groups vied in asserting their readi‑
ness to alleviate civilian suffering and to establish their claims to do so in a timely 
and competent fashion. In short, mass population displacement was politicised as 
a crisis of refugeedom.
In the first instance, of course, refugees served as an emblem of enemy brutality. 
Russian propaganda concentrated on the perpetration of atrocity by German and 
Austrian troops, much as the Allies denounced Germany’s invasion and occupation 
of Belgium. “The enemy [reported a senior Russian official] destroys everything, 
leaving nothing intact. Villages are razed to the ground, homes are burned down; 
where before there was calm and prosperity, now there is devastation, and the popu‑
lation has lost all that is precious.”26 On the Caucasus front, too, Armenian observers 
in cities such as Yerevan referred to “the barbaric actions of Turks and Kurds.” 
In a speech given in March 1915, the renowned parliamentarian Paul Miliukov 
stated that “each time Russia goes to war with Turkey, the Armenian subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire suffer […] including suffering for their belief that at some stage 
Ararat will be free [from Turkish rule]. Let Russian society show the same measure 
of sympathy as it has shown for the freedom of Belgium, Serbia and Poland.” 27 
In other words, the heavy responsibility for refugees’ suffering lay squarely on the 
shoulders of Russia’s adversaries.
What was left out of account in this framing of crisis were the concerted attempts 
by the Russian high command to organise the eviction and resettlement of Jews, 
Poles, Latvians and others, including the German subjects of the Tsar. Russian 
generals confidently asserted that “the complete hostility of the entire Jewish popu‑
lation towards the Russian army is well established.” Russian troops, including 
Cossack soldiers far from home who encountered Polish Jews for the first time, 
25. For early accounts by contemporary participants, see P. Gronsky and N.I. Astrov, The War 
and the Russian Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), and Tikhon Polner, 
Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1930).
26. Remarks of A.B. Neidgardt, reported in Komitet ee Imperatorskogo Vysochestva Velikoi 
Kniazhny Tatiany Nikolaevny po okazaniiu vremennoi pomoshchi postradavshim ot voennykh 
deistvii, 14 sentabria 1914 g. po ianvaria 1916 g.) [The Committee of Her Royal Highness 
Tatiana Nikolaevna for the temporary relief of victims of war, 14 September 1914 to January 
1916], volume 1 (Petrograd, 1916), 244.
27. Mshak, 76 (1 April 1915). Miliukov is quoted in Mshak, 60 (22 March 1915).
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easily mistook Yiddish for German, and this ignorance only reinforced the message 
from their superiors that Jews were not to be trusted. Such distorted preconcep‑
tions underpinned widespread attacks on Jews and Jewish property. What began 
as sporadic and unsystematic actions in 1914 turned into methodical deportations 
in the spring of 1915, accompanied by mass looting. As many as 600,000 Russian 
Jews were displaced.28 The Russian high command and the Ministry of the Interior 
also drew up plans as early as August 1914 for the removal of German settlers 
from several districts in the western borderlands. One leading government official 
expressed a widely‑held view: “the colonists […] live so detached an existence 
from the native Russian population that, all in all, they constitute a ready base for 
a German attack through our southern provinces.” By the end of the year, after 
a vitriolic press campaign, steps were taken to drive them all out of the western 
borderlands. Around 200,000 individuals were affected by this action, their jour‑
neys to Siberia supervised by armed military or police detachments.29 
Only fragments of this story emerged during the war. One clue to the actions 
of the state in unleashing mass displacement was the decree of 30 August 1915, 
according to which refugees were defined as “individuals who left their localities 
under the threat of or occupied by the enemy” but also who were “deported from the 
military zones at the command of either military or civil authorities.” The decree 
also encompassed “individuals originating from Russia’s enemy states.”30 The 
categories and procedures for determining refugees’ eligibility are hotly debated 
in refugee studies, but in wartime Russia the distinction between those who “fled” 
and those who were forcibly removed deported became blurred. Instead, contempo‑
rary discourse referred to “victims of war” or to “refugees” without distinguishing 
between the causes of displacement.31 
Government oversight of the refugee question rested with the new Special 
Council for Refugees [Osoboe soveshchanie po ustroistvo bezhentsev], which 
was established in August 1915. Like other special councils created in the same 
month, it was chaired by a cabinet minister, in this case the minster of the interior. 
It allocated around 200 million rubles in the course of the war, equivalent to more 
than two‑thirds of total expenditure on refugee relief.32 The special council was not 
28. Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: the Campaign against Enemy Aliens during 
World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Joshua A. Sanborn, Drafting 
the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War and Mass Politics, 1905‑1925 (DeKalb: 
University of Northern Illinois Press, 2003), 116‑22. For a contemporary account, see Polly 
Zavadivker, ed., 1915 Diary of S. An‑sky: A Russian Jewish Writer at the Eastern Front 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). 
29. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 23‑24.
30. Zakony i raspolozheniia o bezhentsakh [Laws and arrangements about refugees] (M., 
1916), 2; Osobye soveshchaniia i komitety voennogo vremeni [Special commissions and coun‑
cils in wartime] (Petrograd, 1917), 47.
31. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 33‑48; Andrew Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee?” Ethics, 
95, 2 (1985): 274‑284; Roger Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee 
Label in an Era of Globalisation,” Journal of Refugee Studies, 20, 2 (2007): 172‑192.
32. Kirzhnits, “Bezhenstvo.”
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immune from the effects of the growing economic crisis, and in December 1916 
informed the organisations it funded of the need to adjust to a 50 per cent cut in 
their budget. At the same time, the Tsar’s plenipotentiary in the Caucasus instructed 
relief agencies to enlist refugees in the search for paid work, in order to reduce their 
reliance on government funds.33 The question of entitlement emerged in discussions 
of the arrangements for the registration of refugees at a local level. In Khar’kov, for 
example, refugees who approached the municipality for assistance had to “demon‑
strate that they are actually from areas suffering from military action.”34
The Tatiana Committee (Komitet Ee Imperatorskogo Vysochestva Velikoi 
Kniazhny Tatiany Nikolaevny dlia okazaniia pomoshchi postradavshim ot voen‑
nykh deistvii) occupied pride of place in the operational arrangements for refugee 
relief. It collected and distributed cash and goods to all refugees. It published lists 
and photos of refugee children who had been separated from their parents. Although 
critics accused it of being an establishment entity, this was much less true of the 
committee’s regional branches which, as in Novgorod, included priests, landlords, 
teachers, lawyers, workers and peasant farmers. It galvanised middle‑class women 
into collecting money, distributing food and warm clothing, arranging temporary 
accommodation for refugees and finding them part‑time work in order to maintain 
their morale.35 The committee supplemented its budget from the central govern‑
ment with private donations and from funds derived from organised campaigns 
such as those associated with the Tsar’s daughter’s name‑day. Its employees drew 
no salary, so overheads were low, as its chairman, senator Aleksei B. Neidgardt 
reminded the Russian public, in a barb directed at the rival public organisations.36 
Early in the war Tsar Nicholas II also approved the formation of the union of 
zemstvos and the union of towns. Their leaders envisaged closer collaboration 
between themselves, and in July 1915 they revived the joint organisation, Zemgor, 
which had briefly seen the light of day during the Russo‑Japanese War. In addition 
to attempting to improve military supplies, Zemgor took steps to support refugees, 
particularly during the long and arduous journey from the western borderlands 
to the Russian interior. These self‑styled public organisations (obshchestvennye 
organizatsii) maintained not only that the wheels of officialdom turned slowly and 
that civic activism outstripped anything that could be expected from organisations 
associated with the state, notably the Red Cross and the Tatiana Committee. Like 
33. Letter dated 15 December 1916, Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Armenii [Central 
State Archive of Armenia], f. 50, op. 1, d. 127, l. 90.
34. Komitet ee Imperatorskogo Vysochestva, 453.
35. Ibid., 258‑260, 416‑417 (reports from Novgorod and Tver´ respectively).
36. See the report by Neidgardt to the congress of activists of the Tatiana Committee meeting 
between 16 and 19 April 1917, Izvestiia Vserossiiskogo komiteta dliia okazaniia pomoshchi 
postradaiushchikh ot voennykh bedstvii [News of the All‑Russian Committee for aid to 
victims of war], 20 (1917). Neidgardt, a conservative landowners from Nizhnii Novgorod, was 
P.A. Stolypin’s brother‑in‑law. In 1918 he and his family were shot by the Bolsheviks. On 
the public organisations, see Olga Pichon‑Bobrinskoy, “Action publique, action humanitaire 
pendant le premier conflit mondial: les zemstvos et les municipalités,” Cahiers du Monde russe, 
46, 4 (2005): 699‑718.
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the Tatiana Committee, the public organisations maintained an active profile at a 
provincial level.37
Alongside these bodies, new national committees assumed considerable impor‑
tance during the war to assist non‑Russian refugees, particularly Latvian, Lithua‑
nian, Armenian, Polish, and Jewish refugees – significantly, no special provision 
was made for Ukrainian refugees.38 In one sense the emergence of national commit‑
tees is unsurprising given the geographical contours of war in the multinational 
Russian Empire. But the licence they received was unprecedented. This freedom 
of action owed much to the resource constraints of the tsarist state, which was 
obliged to devolve much of the day‑to‑day responsibility for refugee relief on to 
these committees, whose leaders were given seats on the Special Council and on the 
Tatiana Committee. Patriotic activists seized the opportunity to express a sense of 
“national” calamity that in turn required solidarity. Deliberate action was needed, 
in the words of the Latvian activist Janis Goldmanis, to ensure that Latvians avoid 
“the lot of the Jews, to be scattered across the entire globe.” Polish activists spoke of 
“preserving the refugee on behalf of the motherland.” Lithuanian clergy paid close 
attention to the moral fibre of refugees.39 Generally speaking, displacement afforded 
these patriotic elites direct access to a nascent national community. Refugee relief 
instructed the displaced farmer or labourer what it meant to be Armenian, Polish, 
Jewish or Latvian. Wartime encounters between different ethnic groups—one 
thinks of instances when Latvians or Poles were mistaken for Germans and targeted 
accordingly—reinforced a sense of ethnic particularism. Goldmanis was not alone 
in articulating a vision of a reclaimed homeland, whose farms should in due course 
be re‑populated by “people who think and act in a Latvian manner.”40 
National committees challenged existing non‑Russian communities to come to 
the aid of those with a similar ethnic background – for example, by organising 
a head‑count of refugees and levying taxes on settled co‑nationals in provincial 
towns and cities in European Russia, thereby forcing them to confront the question 
of their “identity.” Already at the beginning of 1915, for example, the Tbilisi‑based 
newspaper Mshak [Labourer] reported that 100,000 Armenian refugees (as well as 
Assyrians and Greeks) had crossed into Russia from Turkey and Persia. It called 
upon Armenian “colonies” in Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Ekaterinodar and 
other cities to focus on what it termed “a national question.” Russian Armenians 
donated money to support refugees who already thronged Yerevan and Etchmi‑
adzin. In the spirit of accountability, the committees also explained to readers how 
their donations were being spent and justified their existence with reference to the 
37. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 37‑47.
38. National relief committees also operated in German‑occupied Lithuania on behalf of Lith‑
uanian, Polish and Jewish groups. See Andrea Griffante, “Making the Nation: Refugees, Indi‑
gent People, and Lithuanian Relief, 1914‑1920,” in Balkelis and Davoliūtė, eds, Population 
Displacement in Lithuania, 21‑41.
39. Tomas Balkelis, “Forging a ‘Moral Community’: the Great War and Lithuanian refugees in 
Russia,” in Balkelis and Davoliūtė, eds, Population Displacement in Lithuania, 42‑61.
40. See the sources quoted in Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 156, 159.
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effectiveness of the aid they delivered. Newspapers published accounts that item‑
ised in detail the number of meals and beds that had been assigned to refugees.41 A 
similar response applied to other minorities. At a local level the different national 
committees got on reasonably well and encouraged local communities to set aside 
any differences on “fraternal” grounds. They mobilised refugees by linking relief to 
ethnicity, with impressive results that ultimately contributed to the destabilisation 
of the Russian Empire.42
The significance of the relief effort was not confined to political ambitions. 
Fears—anxieties around social upheaval, moral collapse, health crises—were 
projected on to refugees. Ten years after the revolution, Kirzhnits alluded to the 
fact that refugees yielded to “spontaneous” impulses in order to save their skin 
or were despatched to the Russian interior by tsarist military commanders in a 
haphazard fashion.43 But this was already a common trope, serving both to highlight 
refugees’ loss of self‑control and to legitimise an extensive intervention by profes‑
sional expertise—social workers, doctors, nurses, psychiatrists, lawyers, statisti‑
cians, teachers, and so on. This is not to underestimate the extent of suffering that 
afflicted hungry and sick refugees or to minimise the psychological consequences 
of separation from family members and the overwhelming uncertainty of war. But 
it draws attention to the ways in which displacement was being characterised at the 
time. Charitable relief work necessitated the creation of images of suffering that 
portrayed refugees as passive victims of war who needed guidance to recover their 
capacity to make a contribution to society.44
Refugees, revolution and repatriation: 1917 and beyond
The scale of population displacement in the Russian Empire during the war 
beggared belief. Russia’s refugee crisis did not cease with the overthrow of tsarist 
rule. According to the renowned Soviet demographer, E.Z. Volkov, the total 
number of refugees in Russia on 1 January 1917 stood at just over six million. Six 
months later, as the war showed no signs of coming to an end, it had increased to 
7.4 million. At the beginning of 1918, following the Bolshevik Decree on Peace, 
41. “O bezhentsakh [On refugees ],” Mshak, 2 (4 January 1915). In March 1915 some refugees 
opted to return to their villages in order to prepare for the spring sowing, under the protection of 
the Russian army, as reported in Mshak, 58 (18 March 1915).
42. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 168‑70. Here, too, students of the wartime refugee crisis 
are indebted to findings in refugee studies that detect powerful expressions of “national iden‑
tity,” particularly where refugees from specific ethnic groups are closely confined. The classic 
statement is Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology 
among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). For more on 
wartime mobilisation in Russia, see Melissa K. Stockdale, Mobilising the Russian Nation: 
Patriotism and Citizenship in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), particularly chapter 4, “War Relief and the Language of Citizenship.”
43. Kirzhnits, “Bezhenstvo.”
44. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 73‑83.
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Russia’s new leaders calculated that the number was around four million, but since 
this figure only took account of the territory under its control, the real figure was 
certainly much higher.45 
Political changes inevitably affected the administration of refugee relief. Pres‑
sure mounted in 1917 for reform. On the eve of the February Revolution a progres‑
sive newspaper editor wrote that “the ruling classes and the spokesmen of countless 
government departments keep telling us that the care of refugees, like the war 
itself, is a national affair. Well, if this is the case, give the people themselves the 
chance to speak their mind.”46 Unsurprisingly, the Tatiana Committee had a hard 
job countering the call for its democratisation. Its leadership took steps to address 
its elite character, dropping Tatiana’s name, introducing elections to key posts in 
spring 1917, and inviting refugees themselves to stand for office—a radical depar‑
ture, given that it has not been common practice to involve refugees in managing 
their own affairs.47 There followed a broadly‑based congress devoted to refugees in 
April 1917 at which they were promised personal respect in return for espousing the 
doctrine of self‑reliance, an acknowledgement not only of the new political atmos‑
phere but also of the dwindling resources for refugee relief. Administrative changes 
did nothing to address the fundamental financial difficulties faced by aid agencies 
during the worsening economic crisis.48
Democratisation also influenced the stance taken by national committees. The 
political activism of the professional intelligentsia enabled them to claim a share in 
the leadership of the national movements that burgeoned after February 1917. The 
collapse of the old regime created a political space for Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish 
and other patriots to articulate a vision of freedom and greater autonomy. But it 
was heavily qualified, as is evident from the experience of Latvian activists who 
faced the dispersal of so many potential citizens: as one progressive newspaper put 
it, “the only people to have returned are men on the make, spivs and the kind of 
women who have a bad name […] Latvia is beset by lethargy, military discipline, 
money and cheap favours. There is only one solution, and that is for the Latvian 
intelligentsia to go back home.” Unfortunately, the late summer of 1917 brought 
further disaster. German troops entered Riga on 21 August, Russian forces retreated 
45. E.Z. Volkov, Dinamika narodonaseleniia SSSR za vosem´desiat let [Dynamics of the popu‑
lation of the USSR over 80 years ](M.: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel´stvo, 1930), 70‑73; Gatrell, 
A Whole Empire Walking, 212‑213.
46. V. Muizhel´, cited in Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 172.
47. Trudy Vtorogo Vserossiiskogo s´´ezda predstavitelei mestnykh otdelenii Vserossi‑
iskogo komiteta dliia okazaniia pomoshchi postradaiushchikh ot voiny (Tatiianskogo), 
16‑19 aprelia 1917 g. [Proceedings of the Second All‑Russian Congress of local branches of 
the All‑Russian Committee for the Relief of Victims of War (Tatiana committee), 16‑19 April 
1917](Petrograd: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1917), 80‑87. On the lack of refugee participa‑
tion in relief work, see the critique by Barbara Harrell‑Bond, “The Experience of Refugees as 
Recipients of Aid,” in Alistair Ager, ed., Refugees: Perspectives on the Experience of Forced 
Migration (London: Continuum, 1999), 136‑168.
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in disarray, and the number of refugees swelled yet again.49 The resulting political 
uncertainty continued after the October Revolution, which drew yet greater atten‑
tion to divisions between the Bolsheviks, other socialists, liberals and conservatives 
as to the stance to adopt towards refugees.
As the Russian war effort ground to a halt towards the end of 1917, large numbers 
of non‑Russian refugees remained scattered throughout the old empire. Many of 
them made plans to return, others threw in their lot with the Bolsheviks, rejecting 
the national committees in favour of class‑based organisations, notably the soviets. 
In the short term the prospect of peace encouraged the first steps enabling refugees 
to return to their homes. Some refugees managed to travel surreptitiously, but the 
administrative and logistical difficulties proved insurmountable for most. In any 
case, the Soviet authorities frowned upon “spontaneous” repatriation.50 
In the immediate weeks following Brest‑Litovsk, the Soviet government 
entrusted the administration of re‑evacuation to the national committees whose 
provincial officials actively sought to establish the size and current place of resi‑
dence of the refugee population. However, much of their work was quickly taken 
over by a new Soviet authority. At the end of April 1918 the Soviet Central Admin‑
istration for Prisoners of War and Refugees (Tsentroplenbezh) came into being, 
by which time, however, local and regional soviets had begun to claim a more 
prominent role in determining the future of refugees, with the aim of supplanting 
purely “national” bodies. Tsentroplenbezh launched a fresh registration of refugees 
on Soviet territory.51 In its first six months of operation, Tsentroplenbezh and its 
regional offices assisted 400,000 refugees to return to their homes, mostly in states 
that had recently declared their independence. National organisations continued to 
apply themselves to the task of refugee relief and to engage in cultural and educa‑
tional projects to promote “national consciousness” among the “inert masses.” By 
June 1918 Soviet regional authorities felt sufficiently confident to curtail the activi‑
ties of all non‑governmental organisations in the sphere of refugee relief.52
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These administrative changes preceded another enormous round of population 
displacement. The Russian Civil War obstructed the return of World War refu‑
gees to their former homes and also caused civilians to move from place to place 
in search of safety in order to evade conscription, forced labour, deportation or 
worse. Between May and November 1918, around 400,000 refugees left Russia for 
territory that was under German occupation, for example in Kiev, and this scenario 
was repeated elsewhere, as cities such as Riga and Vilno constantly changed hands 
during the civil war. Further north, the Baltic region turned into a battleground in 
which new national armies in Latvia and Lithuania contended with “White” forces, 
with the Red Army, and with troops under the command of the infamous General 
von der Goltz. Meanwhile, Poland’s occupation of Belorussia and parts of Volynia 
led contemporaries to observe that the roads in and out of towns such as Minsk 
were crowded with refugees and “speculators.” Conversely, the Soviet invasion 
prompted an exodus of propertied Poles from towns such as Bialystok. The civil 
war had particularly pernicious consequences for Jews, some of whom tried to 
make their way westwards in order to avoid pogroms.53 
By 1921, diplomatic agreements between the Soviet state and its neighbours 
facilitated a further round of repatriation, which called for the registration of refu‑
gees who were entitled to be furnished with the necessary documents. Around 
1.3 million Poles were repatriated from Soviet Russia, for example.54 At this 
stage, external aid agencies made an important contribution to the process of 
resettlement. British and American Quakers devoted immense efforts towards 
assisting repatriated refugees. This took place against the backdrop of frequently 
unhelpful policies adopted by ‘bourgeois’ states towards “re‑evacuees,” some 
of whom they mistrusted on political or ethnic grounds or believed to consti‑
tute a health threat. Generally speaking, the new successor states engaged in 
nation‑building projects that marginalised or excluded those who did not belong 
to the dominant nationality.55
One outcome of revolution and civil war was the exodus of between one and 
one and a half million refugees—not all of them ethnically Russian—to Central 
and Western Europe, North America, and the Far East. This exodus is well covered 
in the literature.56 The presence in Europe of stateless Russians and Armenians 
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prompted new relief organisations to proffer assistance, whilst the new League 
of Nations debated the legal status of these refugees. The League’s high commis‑
sioner for refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, with a tiny office and a modest budget, 
relief heavily on voluntary relief organisations to provide refugees with material 
support. Zemgor in particular played a prominent part in this emerging interna‑
tional refugee regime.57 
Along with other relief organisations Zemgor was closely involved in aiding 
refugees, particulalry in war‑ravaged Armenia, in Constantinople, and in territo‑
ries that hitherto formed part of the Ottoman Empire.58 Humanitarian assistance 
was again informed by cultural representations of displacement. An American 
correspondent reported on the plight of 20,000 Armenian refugees in Tbilisi in 
1918: these people made for “a droll and pathetic sight.” His report was directed 
at a transatlantic readership. It did not stint on graphic images of distress, degrada‑
tion and hunger. Thus, in Aleksandropol´ and Yerevan he encountered emaciated 
refugee “children, but I really mean wizened and ancient dwarfs” living among 
adults who “showed the gentle somnolence of lotus eaters.”59 In the Caucasus in 
particular, Anglophone and Francophone humanitarian involvement on behalf of 
Armenian refugees included a strong Christian dimension, something also evident 
in the title of the book of stories (The Cross) collected from Armenian survivors of 
the genocide by the Armenian doctor Aram Sahakian (1884‑1968), who worked 
as resident doctor at the main refugee camp in Port Said.60 These relief efforts and 
cultural representations of disease and degradation, carrying more than a whiff of 
“orientalism,” persisted into the 1920s.61
Nonetheless, a purely Western perspective is partial and misleading. Humani‑
tarianism derived from a variety of sources, rested upon various motives and took a 
variety of forms of expression. To be sure, Russian and Armenian refugees became 
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a major focus of international humanitarian concern.62 Within the successor states, 
foreign relief workers such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
and the Society of Friends (Quakers) played an important part in assisting refu‑
gees irrespective of ethnicity.63 But not all humanitarian relief work emanated from 
outside. Armenian refugees benefited from foreign relief programmes, but Arme‑
nian organisations were also active in Constantinople in 1918‑1922.64 Nor should 
we overlook the concerted efforts of the new Armenian socialist republic to assist 
Armenians who had been displaced by war and genocide.65 Class‑based programmes 
linked the rehabilitation of refugees to fundamental social and economic transfor‑
mation, whether of Eastern Europe or the Near East. But this is another story.66
Refugee voices
Throughout the twentieth century refugees confronted all manner of challenges in 
expressing their opinions. Then, as now, refugees were normally seen rather than 
heard, except in the very specific circumstances associated with making a claim to 
asylum. As a result, and as implied in the foregoing discussion of contemporary 
observations by Thurstan, Pollock and Nikol´skii, much of what appears in the 
documentary record reflects external perspectives and priorities.67 Occasionally the 
fog lifts, allowing the reader to glimpse something of refugees’ perspectives. For 
instance, an editorial in an obscure Russian publication issued by a group of refu‑
gees lamented that “we long to become people once again. We are living people 
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[with] the misfortune to have been displaced, but we are human beings all the 
same.”68 But this kind of testimony is very rare.
Perhaps most remarkable in terms of its content were the words of a female 
eye‑witness—unfortunately, nothing of is known of her other than her name and 
gender. In a contribution to another short‑lived journal, Sputnik bezhentsa [The 
Refugee’s Guide] she wrote:
Not so long ago, these people lived a full and independent working life. They had 
the right to be just like us, that is, indolent, rude and ungrateful. Now they have 
lost this prerogative; their poverty and helplessness oblige them to be meek and 
grateful, to smile at people they don’t like, to answer each and every question 
without the right to ask questions of their own, to submit to the authority of people 
they don’t respect and have no wish to know, to accept disadvantageous terms 
from those who wish to take advantage of their poverty and misfortunes …69
Her observations have surely never been bettered as an eloquent expression of 
empathy, yet its poignancy and directness of tone only reinforces the point that 
most testimony is mediated by non‑refugees.
It is worth drawing attention to the far‑sighted recognition by the Tatiana 
Committee of the need to create an archive of its activities, its guiding principles, 
and the impact of its actions on refugees. Its attempts, perhaps inevitably, were 
rather triumphalist in tone, but in soliciting letters from refugees the committee 
demonstrated its willingness to listen to the voices of refugees. The committee 
issued a detailed questionnaire at the end of 1916, which was accompanied by the 
remark that refugees should be “free to express themselves.” No other relief agency 
took such a bold and imaginative step, and aid agencies have struggled ever since 
to do something similar.70 Some of the results were remarkable. Iakov Vol´rat, an 
elderly refugee, identified as a “refugee‑volost scribe from Kurland province,” 
writing from Odessa in December 1916, vividly described the pain and torment 
he and his family (a wife and five daughters) suffered as a result of being forced 
to flee from his village in a great hurry before making his way to European Russia 
where he eventually found work with the Latvian refugee relief committee. The 
most striking aspect of his testimony was his comment that “my life as a forced 
migrant in a foreign land (na chuzhbine) has been interesting from the point of view 
of observing human life.” Although many Latvians were anxious lest their Russian 
hosts mistake them for Germans, in fact Vol´rat found nothing but sympathy and 
support. Had he not been a refugee, he concluded, he would have been deprived of 
68. Bezhenets, 18 October 1915.
69. E. Vystavkina, “Ikh dushi [Their souls],” Sputnik bezhentsa, September‑October 1915.
70. Izvestiia Komiteta ee Imperatorskogo Vysochestva Velikoi Kniazhny Tatiany Nikolaevny 
dlia okazaniia pomoshchi postradavshim ot voennykh deistvii, no. 15 (1916). Some short 
extracts from refugees’ correspondence appeared in Vera Slavenson, “Bezhenskoe: po povodu 
pisem bezhentsev [Refugeeness: concerning refugees’ letters],” Vestnik Evropy, 51, no.7 
(1916): 292‑301. See also Simon Harris, “Listening to the Displaced: Analysis, Accountability 
and Advocacy in Action,” Forced Migration Review, 8 (2000): 20‑21.
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the opportunity late in life to get to know “places, people and customs” in Russia. 
There was, his testimony suggested, much more to displacement than trauma.71
The Tatiana Committee was also instrumental in organising an exhibition of 
refugees’ handicrafts. Construed as an initiative “of general state significance,” the 
aim was largely to demonstrate that refugees were hard‑working and not dependent 
solely on state aid. But it also served to underscore the fact that refugees had intro‑
duced “new forms of handicraft production,” as peasant refugees from Galicia had 
begun to do in Siberia and other “remote corners.” Here, significantly, was the idea 
of the refugees as Kulturträger. More broadly, the exhibition was conceived as 
an opportunity to tell the story of refugees’ flight (including, not surprisingly, the 
brutality of the enemy) and resettlement and to create a legacy for the future—“a 
history of the movements of refugees.” To this end, the organisers invited people 
to submit “photographs, sketches, maps (kartogrammy), diagrams, reports, and so 
on.”72 Although the initiative ended with the February Revolution, it draws atten‑
tion to an imaginative strand of thinking on the part of Russia’s professional intelli‑
gentsia: personal testimony could include material objects as well.
The voice of the individual emerges only intermittently in the immediate after‑
math of the First World War. In May 1919 a group of Polish teachers in Riazan´ 
complained of their desperate material plight, but added that their wish to return 
to Poland was prompted by grander ambitions: “we have a natural wish to go back 
to our native country, where a new and brighter future awaits us in free Poland […] 
we are anxious to re‑establish contact with our families who remained behind there, 
and we have a passionate desire to serve our homeland during the difficult time 
of its foundation.”73 In a diary entry, Alfreds Goba, a young Latvian refugee who 
moved back to “new Latvia” from his temporary domicile in Baku, wrote: “Now 
I am working. I am working towards building a new Latvia.” Three months later 
Goba welcomed Germany’s readiness to engage in peace negotiations, but hoped 
that the future would bring freedom from German and Russian tutelage alike:
I don’t know if something bad happened in Latvian affairs or if for some other 
reason Latvia, like me, has to be between Scylla and Charybdis. One master isn’t 
yet gone and already another is near to rule and suckle […] Latvia, Latvia you 
71. “Begstvo ot germantsev i skitaniia [Flight from Germans and wandering],” Izvestiia 
Komiteta, no. 19 (15 April 1917): 17‑22. See also Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee; 
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macy in Austria‑Hungary in the First World War,” in Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee, eds, 
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Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), 102‑126 (112‑113). In the late nineteenth century the 
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Taithe, “Humanitarian History?” in Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny H. Peterson, eds, The Rout‑
ledge Companion to Humanitarian Action (London, Routledge, 2015), 62‑73.
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have lived a hard and slavish orphan life, and still you are like a child. Will you 
survive? Will you be able to stand on your own two feet?
Goba saw a close fit between the need to establish his family on more secure mate‑
rial foundations and Latvia’s search for national liberation.74 This is a reminder that 
personal testimony was connected to broader narratives and ambitions.
The attempt to ascertain refugees’ perspectives on their experiences of exile 
emerged in a small yet politically significant project undertaken by Baroness Mariia 
Vrangel´, the mother of the famous White Russian general, who issued question‑
naires to around 400 refugees who fled Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. A 
recent analysis of her findings concludes that Russian émigrés drew a clear distinc‑
tion between their identity as “authentic” Russians and other exiles of non‑Russian 
ethnicity, particularly Jews, as well as anyone who had emigrated before 1914 for 
what were deemed to be “economic” reasons. These various groups were excluded 
from “Russia abroad.” Political differences also surfaced in the diaspora: one of 
Vrangel’s informants studiously castigated those who had not fought for the White 
armies as mere “refugees” who did not deserve the epithet of “exiles.” Displace‑
ment, in other words, emphasized exclusion and exclusiveness—or, put another 
way, some voices counted more than others.75
Conclusions
This article began by considering the production of silence about refugeedom and 
indicated how it contributed to the impoverishment of the historiography of war 
and revolution. But the prospects for an approach unfettered by previous perspec‑
tives and shibboleths were not damaged irretrievably. After a protracted lack of 
attention, the impact of war and revolution on refugees in Russia has become 
an active topic of research. The literature has rediscovered what contemporaries 
understood, namely that mass population displacement posed fundamental ques‑
tions about state legitimacy. The tsarist regime neither prevented enemy incur‑
sions that propelled people from their homes in vast numbers – indeed, it directly 
contributed to forced migration—nor did it have the capacity to address the plight 
of refugees. Public organisations, notably Zemgor, and newly‑formed national 
committees rushed to fill that gap by claiming to act more effectively on behalf of 
refugees as “victims of war.” The tsarist state was nevertheless heavily involved 
74. I am grateful to Aldis Purs for permitting me to quote from his translation of the Goba diary 
(the emphasis in the quotation is mine).
75. A respondent living in Cairo objected that the local Club of United Russians “is only 
Russian by name—three quarters of its members are Yids.” See Laurie Manchester, “How 
Statelessness Can Force Refugees To Redefine Their Ethnicity: What Can Be Learned From 
Russian Émigrés Dispersed To Six continents in the Inter‑War Period?,” Immigrants and 
Minorities, 34, 1 (2016): 70‑91, quotation on p. 76. Manchester’s article draws upon the papers 
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indirectly in refugee relief, since it held most of the purse‑strings. It devolved 
day‑to‑day responsibility on to other agencies, including the semi‑official Tatiana 
Committee, which forged a working relationship with the public organisations 
and with the national committees. 
The Tatiana Committee explicitly relied upon imperial patronage, but its elite 
association did not turn it into a backward‑looking institution. Many of the actions 
of the Tatiana Committee have a modern ring. In addition to its attention to detail 
in establishing feeding points and health care, the committee attached great impor‑
tance to counting heads in order to establish the potential demand for basic neces‑
sities at a time of constrained resources. Another priority was to enable refugees to 
make contact with one another. The committee also committed itself, albeit belat‑
edly, to engaging with refugees on the basis of mutual respect. It demonstrated a 
willingness to listen to refugees and to emphasising that refugees were capable 
and hard‑working rather than apathetic and hopeless individuals. Modern human‑
itarian relief work relies heavily on endorsement by celebrities from the enter‑
tainment industry and from sport. Tsarist Russia had a humanitarian figurehead 
in the shape of Tatiana, but tsarism was a tainted brand, and revolutionary rhet‑
oric soon removed the more enterprising activities of the Tatiana committee from 
public view.76 This belonged to a broader and concerted process that minimised 
the political significance of the refugee crisis and the actions of those who sought 
to alleviate it, and contributed to the marginalisation of refugees’ experiences of 
“suffering” and “deliverance” after 1917. 
The new historiography of refugeedom has also begun to address the relation‑
ship between war, revolution, state formation, and population displacement. It 
directs attention to the ways in which the mobilisation of refugees gave the patriotic 
intelligentsia among non‑Russian national committees unprecedented and consid‑
erable experience of practical administration, enabling them to develop a kind of 
embryonic government bureaucracy. This perspective reverses the link between the 
formation of nation‑states and the “refugee‑generating process.” In other words, 
refugees were the product of the formation of new nation‑states after 1918, but 
displacement was also the precursor to state formation.77 
As we have seen, the humanitarian response to the wartime refugee crisis in 
Russia was heavily politicised. In this respect, tsarist Russia conformed to modern 
practices of humanitarianism, insofar as non‑governmental organisations and 
inter‑governmental organisations such as the League of Nations and (since 1951) 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees cannot avoid engaging with 
76. On the tsarist “brand,” see the fundamental work by Boris Kolonitskii, “Tragicheskaia 
erotica”: obrazy imperatorskoi sem´i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny [Tragic erotica: representa‑
tions of the imperial family during the First World War](M.: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 
2010).
77. Aristide Zolberg, “The Formation of New States as a Refugee‑Generating Process,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 467 (1983), 282‑296.
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politics, even as they affirm their apolitical stance.78 Political considerations also 
inflected humanitarian relief efforts after 1917. Soviet Russia’s isolation contrib‑
uted to a sense that the chief humanitarian impulse lay outside Soviet borders, or 
had to be imported at times of emergency such as through the special arrangements 
that enabled the American Relief Administration to engage in relief work during 
the famine of 1921‑1922. This external relief was highly politicised.79 However, 
humanitarianism was not just about national and international intervention. On the 
contrary, local efforts to engage with displaced people should not be overlooked. 
They retained their importance in the aftermath of the revolution, even though revo‑
lution and state formation created very different conditions making life much more 
uncertain for refugees. 
There is a pressing need to confront entrenched historiographical positions 
regarding Russia’s experience of war and revolution. The dominant narratives of 
revolution found little room for social activity and experiences that could not easily 
be accommodated within the framework of conventional political organisations 
or linked to the revolutionary teleology that legitimised the Bolshevik seizure of 
power. Refugees were overlooked in these narratives; they did not “fit in,” and their 
voices went unheard. The “new social history” of revolution concentrated upon 
organised social forces, whose actions impinged directly on the existing forms of 
state power and whose spokesmen left behind compelling accounts of political 
struggle. The conceptualisation of displacement offered in this article, together 
with the various manifestations of refugee relief efforts, invites us to extend our 
focus without losing sight of broader issues of social and political transformation. 
Refugees may have lived on the margins, but “the apparently marginal, when set in 
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